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Albert Camus’ existentialist novel The Stranger ends with its protagonist, Meursault, 
awaiting his execution. His ostensible crime? The murder of an Arab whose name Camus never 
discloses.   
But it is not the facts surrounding the murder that ultimately seal Meursault’s fate in the 
eyes of his jury. Rather, what transforms him from a mere criminal to a condemnable person is 
that he does not grieve his mother (whose death serves as the tableau that introduces the novel). 
The warden of the home for the aged where Meursault’s mother died testifies that he was 
surprised by Meursault’s “calmness” on the day of her funeral, explaining that Meursault had not 
“wanted to see Mother’s body, or shed a single tear,” and had left immediately after the funeral, 
not “lingering at her grave.” Another witness attested that after declining to see his mother’s 
body, Meursault cavalierly smoked cigarettes and drank café au lait, facts the prosecutor alleges 
show that Meursault had no “respect for the dead body of the poor woman who brought him into 
the world.” (Camus 1946: 56-57) Subsequent testimony about Meursault’s lack of grief turns the 
screws further. His mother’s elderly companion, Perez swears that Meursault was completely 
indifferent to his mother’s death. The prosecutor concludes from the testimony of Meursault’s 
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girlfriend Marie and his neighbor Raymond that Meursault, having engaged in “shameless 
orgies” only a day after his mother’s death, was far from grief stricken. (Camus 1946: 60)  
By this point Meursault has already deciphered the prosecution strategy and recognizes, 
as we the readers do, that “for the first time I understood that I was guilty.” But it takes the 
prosecutor’s lurid description of “the type of man the prisoner is” to finally provoke Meursault’s 
lawyer to interject: 
 “Is my client on trial for having buried his mother, or for killing a man?” he asked.  
 There were some titters in court. But then the Prosecutor sprang to his feet and, draping his gown 
round him, said he was amazed at his friend’s ingenuousness in failing to see that between these two 
elements of the case there was a vital link. They hung together psychologically, if he might put it so. “In 
short,” he concluded, speaking with great vehemence, “I accuse the prisoner of behaving at his mother’s 
funeral in a way that showed he was already a criminal at heart.”  
 These words seemed to take much effect on the jury and public. My lawyer merely shrugged his 
shoulders and wiped the sweat from his forehead. But obviously he was rattled, and I had a feeling things 
weren’t going well for me. (Camus 1946: 60)  
By highlighting Meursault’s indifference to his mother’s death, Camus intended to 
emphasize Meursault’s iconoclastic and unbridgeable alienation from societal expectations. As 
Camus later said of the novel: “I summarized The Stranger a long time ago, with a remark I 
admit was highly paradoxical: 'In our society any man who does not weep at his mother's funeral 
runs the risk of being sentenced to death.' I only meant that the hero of my book is condemned 
because he does not play the game.” (Camus 1968: 335)  
Yet I must confess that my own reaction is not admiration for Meursault’s putative 
‘heroism’. For one, most of us hope that we will be grieved after our deaths, so Meursault’s 
callousness at the death of maman seems to betoken moral vice. Why grief seems to be ‘owed’ to 
the dead, particularly on the assumption that bodily death is the permanent cessation of a 
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person’s existence and cannot be survived, is too intricate a question to be credibly addressed 
here. But our misgivings about Meursault’s lack of grief may have a prudential, rather than a 
moral, basis. Meursault seems worthy of pity because he was not able to grieve. For he is bereft 
of the very attachment to his mother (or apparently, to anyone) that would make grief an 
intelligible response to her death. And by not grieving, Meursault seems to be missing out 
something valuable. Shelly Kagan has recently observed that the pains of grief somehow seem 
better than Meursault’s indifference: 
To be sure, normally you would rather not have lost your loved one in the first place. But given that you 
have, is it really the case that you would prefer not to experience any grief at all? That seems wrong; when 
you are aware of the death of someone you love, it hardly seems better for you to be indifferent to that fact. 
On the contrary, it seems better for you to be pained by the loss. (Kagan 2014: 267)  
If Kagan is correct, then if we care about someone like Meursault — if we want what is best for 
him for his sake — we should want him to be able to undergo genuine grief for his mother. For 
despite being emotionally, and even physically, distressing, grief is a valuable part of the human 
condition. That grief in some manner makes our lives better would also explain why we should 
be reluctant to think that grieving indicates some underlying mental illness, as a panel of 
psychiatrists recently proposed.1 For critics of this proposal, such as the prominent psychiatrist 
and medical anthropologist Arthur Kleinman, ‘treating’ grief, including the use of medications 
that  “deprive death of its sting for the survivors and make the experience of loss as painless as 
possible,” would have the unfortunate side effect of depriving us of a uniquely valuable 
                                            
1 The panel was one of several charged with revising the primary diagnostic guide for American mental health 
professionals (American Psychiatric Association 2013). The panel’s recommendation to remove the “bereavement 
exclusion,” (a provision stating that despite grief sometimes satisfying the diagnostic criteria for mental illnesses 
such as depression, it should instead be seen as a normal and expected response to loss) was incorporated into the 
guide. Its recommendation to introduce a new diagnostic category of “prolonged grief disorder” was rejected 
however. 
 4 
emotional experience. (Kleinman 2012: 609) No doubt grief can be a hardship – but except in 
rare cases, isn’t it a hardship we recognize as part of a normal and healthy response to others’ 
deaths? There would, I contend, be something amiss in the life of a person who never grieved. 
To call grief “a game,” as Camus does, reducing it to a set of pro forma rituals mandated by the 
expectations of social etiquette, seems to trivialize a vital and valuable human experience. 
But sober philosophical analysis should invite us to second guess such gut reactions. For 
the pity we may feel for Meursault’s inability to grieve runs headlong into some obvious facts 
about grief. First and foremost, grief is nearly always painful. As we shall see later on, there is 
often much more to grief than pain alone. But the deaths of those who matter to us can lead us to 
prolonged anguish. Grief is also extremely stressful. Stress researchers have repeatedly found 
that the deaths of those close to us (parents, siblings, children, and spouses) are the most stressful 
life events we can undergo, dramatically surpassing even divorce, imprisonment, and 
unemployment in this regard. (Holmes and Rahe 1967, Miller and Rahe 1997) And not 
infrequently, grieving is associated with adverse physical ‘symptoms,’ including intestinal 
problems, insomnia, shaking, heart palpitations, chest pains, shortness of breath, and 
oversensitivity to noise.  Sometimes grief even proves fatal. (Carey et al 2014) Given this 
evidence, why not conclude that instead of pitying Meursault, we ought to envy him? After all, 
his alienation and detachment from other human beings saves him from one of life’s most 
agonizing experiences. 
Our purpose in this article is to determine how best to navigate the tension between these 
two reactions. Is grief a welcome or unwelcome feature of human existence? Should we be glad 
for the opportunity to grieve, or instead lament our vulnerability to grief as a side effect of our 
apparent need for social attachment?  
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1. Grief’s painfulness 
The case for Meursault (and against grief) largely rests on grief’s painfulness. The pain in 
question is primarily psychological rather than ‘bodily’. Some might contest our calling this state 
‘pain.’ Maybe this state is better captured by calling it ‘distress’, ‘anguish’, or ‘suffering’. But 
‘pain’ seems like a good enough term to capture the bad feeling, negatively tinged emotional 
element of grief. 
Answering Meursault, that is, showing that grief can be good or worthwhile, seems to 
require showing that grief is good despite its being painful. Now we must keep in mind here that 
when we speak of grief being good, we have in mind that grief is good for the bereaved. It could 
(again) be true that grief is good from a moral point of view. For instance, perhaps grief is 
morally valuable because it helps people bond with one another during times of sorrow. The 
issue at hand is more pointed: To put the matter first personally, how can my grief be good for 
me — valuable, worthwhile, conducive to my well-being, etc. — despite its being painful to me? 
First, let us consider two ways we might try to answer this question, both of which will 
prove inadequate, before turning to what I contend is a third and better way to account for how 
grief can be good despite its being painful.  
Most everyone will agree that pain is usually unwelcome. But we are not necessarily 
averse to pain. Masochists, for example, find pleasure in otherwise painful experiences. How this 
combination of attitudes or sensations is possible has long puzzled philosophers. (For a recent 
account, see Klein 2014.) It seems unlikely, though, that grief is a species of masochism. 
Masochism is rare, for one, grief nearly ubiquitous. Moreover, masochists (and again, this is a 
difficult mindset for the non-masochist to imagine) somehow take pleasure in certain painful 
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experiences. They come to experience pleasure through and because of pain. Central to 
masochism, then, is that one and same experience is both pleasurable and painful all at once, 
with the pleasure being somehow inseparable from the pain. But this does not seem faithful to 
the reality of grief. Individuals are often drawn to grieve, even in full awareness of its 
painfulness, but the pain of grief is not also pleasurable at the same time. Grieving is therefore 
not a painful pathway to pleasure, as pain is for the masochist. 
So we cannot make sense of how grief can be worthwhile despite being painful by 
claiming that the pain is masochistic in character, a pain in which we nevertheless take pleasure. 
A second way we might show that grief could be good for us despite being painful rests on the 
observation that we sometimes tolerate pain in the belief that it will result in greater good. 
Consider a painful inoculation: The pain itself is bad, but is a cost worth bearing for the greater 
good it proves (immunity from contagious disease). Perhaps the pain of grief simply is bad, but 
can be outweighed by greater pleasures or goods. Grief’s pain, then, is the cost of bereavement.  
This second answer about grief’s value does not succeed either. For one, if pain is the 
cost we pay for grief, what are we paying for — what, in other words, is the good we get in 
exchange? In the case of the painful inoculation, the answer is apparent: protection against the 
disease(s) for which one is immunized. Yet it is far from evident what we might get in return for 
the pains of grief. As it will turn out, there is a good that grief provides us (as I will try to 
persuade you later). Yet for the moment, in the absence of an explanation of the good we get in 
exchange for the pains of grief, this answer is incomplete at best. 
This second answer also has strange implications. If pain is the cost of grief, then all 
other things being equal, the less pain associated with an episode of grief, the better that episode 
is for us. But that doesn’t seem right. Imagine two siblings whose father has died. The siblings 
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have similar relationships and histories with their father, so we would expect them to grieve in 
similar ways. Is one sibling better off if she undergoes the psychological pains of grief less 
intensely or for a shorter time? That is far from obvious. Conversely, it is far from obvious that 
being pained by grief longer or more intensely is necessarily worse for a person. In cases where 
the bereaved and deceased were particularly close (think of spouses married for a half century), 
grief should be intensely painful. And if this explanation were correct, the very ‘best’ episodes of 
grief would be entirely painless – and those, I propose, hardly even qualify as episodes of grief. 
In any event, there does not seem to be any correlation between how long or how intense the 
pain of a grief episode and how good or bad it seems from an intuitive point of view. That’s 
enough to cast doubt on this explanation of how grief can be valuable despite its painfulness.  
This answer also faces a third challenge. On this account, the pain of grief is bad in its 
own right but can nevertheless lead to a greater good overall for oneself. The mental anguish of 
grief, according to this account, must be tolerated in order to attain the goods grief affords us. 
Again compare grief’s pains to the pains of an inoculation. The pains of an inoculation are 
undeniably painful. We put up with them in exchange for some greater good. But some bereaved 
individuals do not perceive the pain of grief as a state merely to be tolerated. Rather, they seem 
drawn to it. The Christian philosopher Augustine relates in his Confessions his grief at the death 
of a close friend he had known since childhood: 
My heart was black with grief. Whatever I looked upon had the air of death. My native place was a prison-
house and my home a strange unhappiness. The things we had done together became sheer torment without 
him. My eyes were restless looking for him, but he was not there. I hated all places because he was not in 
them. … I had no delight but in tears, for tears had taken the place my friend had held in the love of my 
heart. (Augustine 2006: book IV, chapter iv, 59-60) 
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Augustine is clearly haunted by his friend’s death. Surprisingly though, he does not refrain from 
the activities that remind him of his deceased friend’s death. On the contrary. Augustine was 
“restless” in seeking out reminders of the friend. He finds “delight” only in the tearful pains of 
grief. Put in the language made familiar by Harry Frankfurt (1999), Augustine has a second-
order desire to do what he would otherwise have a first-order desire to avoid, that is, to undergo 
“unhappiness, “tears,” and “torment.” 
 Augustine therefore does not seem merely to tolerate the pains of grief. Nothing 
Augustine says suggests that his seeking out his friend is pleasant. The pains of grief are 
undoubtedly painful for him. Still, he is attracted to these pains. Augustine thus perceives them 
(in ways he clearly struggles to articulate) as good pains. That the pains of grief are perceived as 
good gives us further reason to reject the thought that those pains are the cost we pay for the 
larger goods made possible by grief. For if Augustine and his ilk are to be trusted, then these 
pains are not costs at all. 
 Still, that these pains might in some way be good may well strike us as mysterious. But 
we are in fact acquainted with good pains. 
 
2. Good pains 
 In my younger days, I ran: 30 or miles per week, five- and ten-kilometer races, the whole 
bit.  Veteran runners will regale you with stories of “runners’ high.” But running also has its 
lows: sensations of overwhelming fatigue are common, for instance. At times, such sensations 
strongly tempt a runner simply to give in and stop. Over time however, I came to judge that these 
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painful sensations were not in fact bad. Indeed, I began to look forward to those pains, and while 
I did not necessarily hope that my daily runs would be maximally painful, I nevertheless found 
that painless runs were somehow ungratifying. 
 This shift in judgments regarding such pains was not because they were not bona fide 
pains. The pain itself — the raw physiological sensation — had not changed, and outside the 
context of running, I would have avoided it. And nearly always, I would attempt to counteract 
the pain that lingered once I completed my runs. My attitudes toward running were not that of 
the masochist though. I wanted my runs to have some measure of physical pain or distress, but 
not because I found the state of pain to be simultaneously pleasant or desirable. When a 
particularly arduous run neared its conclusion, I did not take pleasure in the growing pain I was 
undergoing. It remained unalloyed pain, unmixed with any pleasant sensation.  But nor did I 
straightforwardly view these pains as costs to be borne for some larger good. I wanted to 
undergo these pains despite their being pains simpliciter. I did not judge these pains to be bad 
despite their being painful. 
 How I could have been in such a state – welcoming a genuine pain that was neither 
admixed with pleasure nor a cost to be borne for the sake of some greater good — may seem 
puzzling. Pain is a more complicated condition than we often recognize though. Although pain 
feels bad, how we feel about it — the judgments we make about whether it’s good or bad, 
desirable or undesirable — depend on a wide array of other psychological facts about us. 
(Swenson 2009) Specifically, how we feel about pain can depend on our beliefs and attitudes 
about the larger situation in which the pain occurs. In my own case, the positive attitudes I had 
toward running painted the pains of running in a warmer hue. Something about the context 
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within which I underwent the pains made them good — while still being pains all the same. The 
positive awareness of feeling one’s own fitness, of testing one’s body’s limits, etc., made it the 
case that the pains of running were good pains for me. They still felt bad, mind you. But they did 
not play the role that pain usually plays in our practical thinking and decision making. Rather 
than the pains of running being a reason not to train, they became integrated into the positive 
reasons I had to train. I endorsed the mantra “no pain, no gain,” but not because the pain was the 
cost of the gain. The pain was instead an indispensable element in an activity I found gainful.   
And it would no more have made sense to suppose that extracting the pain from those 
positive activities would make them better than it would make sense to suppose that removing 
the tragic denouement from a Shakespearean tragedy would make the play better. Removing 
Juliet’s suicide from the conclusion of Romeo and Juliet would not make it a better aesthetic 
encounter for the audience. It would simply be a different play, much in the way that running 
would have been a different activity without its accompanying pain. Just as the pain contributes 
non-additively and organically to the positive activity of running, so too does Juliet’s suicide – 
itself a lamentable event — contribute non-additively and organically to the quality of watching 
Shakespeare’s play. 
 Painful but positive activities, in which the pain is valued insofar as it is essential to the 
nature of the activity, are not uncommon in human life. I’ve mentioned distance running, but I 
suspect that a similar pattern will be found in other forms of athletic activity. Powerlifters no 
doubt undergo strain, even pain, in their favored activity. But some evidently welcome these 
 11 
unpleasant sensations. So too firewalkers and aficionados of hot chilis. (Rozin 1990)2 They look 
forward to the pain of such endeavors thanks to their overall attitude toward those endeavors. 
Many women opt for natural childbirth, free of pain medications. While their reasons no doubt 
vary, I would speculate that some desire the pain of labor inasmuch as it is seen as integral to the 
unalloyed experience of childbirth. And in each of these instances, the pain retains its painfulness 
but is axiologically essential to the larger good at hand. 
 Now one might discount these observations by proposing that the positive judgments of 
the painfulness in these cases is a kind of trick played on us by our biology. From the standpoint 
of impartial observers, the pains of distance running, powerlifting, childbirth, and the like clearly 
are bad. But we are biologically constituted so as to be psychologically disposed to find the pains 
associated with these experiences desirable. We thus recategorize these pains as good even 
though they are in fact bad from a more impartial perspective. 
 In reply, note that a biological or psychological explanation of why we find some pains 
good or desirable, particularly pains embedded within larger complexes of goodness, does not 
show that our positive attitudes toward such pains are misguided. In fact, it may only be because 
of such biological or psychological facts that we are in a position to have these positive attitudes 
in the first place. But the availability of such an explanation does not show that these attitudes 
are false, any more than the fact that there is a biological or psychological explanation for our 
ability to visually perceive geometrical shape or for our awareness of our own levels of hunger 
shows that our beliefs about objects’ shapes or our own levels of hunger are false. More than a 
                                            
2 This is not to preclude the possibility that some who engage in firewalking, chili eating, etc., are masochists or bear 
these pains simply as the costs of some larger good. For our purposes, it is sufficient if the analysis of the ‘good 
pains’ in question applies even to a few who participate in such activities.  
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biological explanation of our positive attitudes toward certain pains is therefore needed in order 
to show that those attitudes are systematically misleading. And in the absence of additional 
evidence on this front, the evidence based on our first-personal experiences of these ‘good pains’ 
still stands.  
 If this picture of how pains can contribute to worthwhile activities is plausible, then this 
suggest a possible model for explaining why we are drawn to grieve: Grief’s pains are good 
insofar as they occur within, and are indispensable parts of, an activity which it itself good or 
desirable in some way. Grief’s pains are genuinely painful. Yet just as we welcome pains 
associated with particularly worthwhile activities, so too do many, including Augustine 
apparently, welcome (and even seek out or cultivate) the pains of grief. Hence, because 
Meursault cannot undergo the pains associated with grief, he is thereby missing out on a valuable 
human activity of which psychic pain is an essential part.  
 All the same, a good deal more would have to be said to vindicate this explanation of 
how grief can be both valuable and painful. For one, we do not yet have an account of the 
activity of grieving, of which pain is an essential part. Moreover, we lack an account of how this 
activity could be valuable or worthwhile. In the case of the other activities I have cited, it seems 
clear how the pains fit into some larger good. In the cases of running or powerlifting, chili eating 
or childbirth, it’s not too hard to identify what may be good or valuable about those activities. 
But if the pain of grief is good due to its being part of some larger valuable experience, what is 
that larger valuable experience? To address these issues, we need to delve more deeply into the 
nature of grief itself. 
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3. Who we grieve for  
 Pain is essential to grief, but there is more to grieving than just psychological pain. The 
work of Elisabeth Kubler-Ross popularized the idea that grieving follows a five-step process: 
denial, anger, bargaining, depression, acceptance. Few of those who study grief (including 
Kubler-Ross herself) accept this five-stage model in so simplistic a form. Many people do not 
experience these particular five steps, do not experience them in that particular order, or have 
grief episodes that include other emotional states (for instance, joy or anxiety). Nevertheless, 
there is wide agreement that overwhelmingly, grief is not a single state but a complex set of 
states of which emotional pain is only one part. Grief, as they say, is a structured process 
((Goldie 2011, Higgins 2013), but one that varies from individual to individual and from episode 
to episode. For one person, grief might begin with acceptance, but for another, it might begin 
with anxiety. And one and the same person could have different grief reactions to different 
deaths (the grief she undergoes at the death of her sister may consist of a different set of states or 
stages than the grief she undergoes at the death of her neighbor). The variability of grief is 
unsurprising. Human beings vary, and so too do the relationships they have with those they 
grieve. (Cholbi 2017)  
 In order to grieve someone, we need to have a certain kind of relationship with them. We 
do not, after all, grieve every death. When you scan a newspaper’s obituaries, you may feel 
sorrow as you read about the lives of the deceased. But your reaction to the deaths of strangers, 
while doleful, lacks the personal dimension of grief. Their deaths are important because their 
lives, like all human lives, were important. But their lives, and hence their deaths, are not 
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(usually) especially important to you. The deaths that generate grief, on the other hand, are felt as 
losses to us. 
 The most common sort of loss that prompts grief is the deaths of family or close friends. 
The advent of social media has made it clear, though, that many people also grieve the deaths of 
entertainers or politicians. 2016 saw outpourings of public grief for pop stars (Prince, David 
Bowie), actors (Gene Wilder), athletes (Arnold Palmer), activists (Elie Wiesel), and athletes-
cum-activists (Muhammad Ali). Only a handful of those who grieved the deaths of these public 
figures had any first-hand familiarity or intimacy with these figures. Usually, grief occurs 
between individuals who are familiar or intimate with one other in a bidirectional sense: spouses 
grieve one another’s deaths, siblings grieve one another’s deaths, etc. In the case of public 
figures, the grief is unidirectional. It is no knock on David Bowie to point out that he would have 
grieved the deaths of very few of the fans and admirers who ultimately grieved his death. 
 That we primarily grieve for those with whom we have intimate relationships but also 
grieve for strangers we revere points to the scope of grief. What do those for whom we grieve 
have in common? When we think about our lives and the stories we tell about them, certain 
people stand out much more than others. These will likely include our parents, children, romantic 
partners, family members, close professional associates, long-standing friendships, and so on. 
But people for whom we are essentially strangers can be crucial to the stories we tell about 
ourselves. A musician who had no relationship with David Bowie might nevertheless have 
modeled her music or her aesthetic ideals on his work; an otherwise secular minded Jew might 
have been moved by Wiesel’s Holocaust memoirs to investigate his Jewish heritage; an 
American Muslim may look to Ali’s life for a picture of how to express his faith in a culture 
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traditionally hostile to Islam. Such examples illustrate that we do not have to have an especially 
close or mutual relationship with a person for them to be central to our self-understanding and to 
the stories we tell about our lives. We can have identity-constituting relationships with strangers 
and intimates alike. An identity-constituting relationship is one that figures prominently in our 
autobiographies and in what Christine Korsgaard calls our “practical identities,” the descriptions 
of our values, concerns, and commitments that explain why we feel and act as we do. (1996:101) 
Notice that an identity-constituting relationship is more than just any relationship that might have 
shaped what we are like. An adult who was adopted as a young child was no doubt shaped by his 
genetic relation to his biological parents. But he may or may not have an identity-constituting 
relationship with his biological parents. He may, for instance, be largely uninterested in them and 
see them merely as part of the causal background through which he came into existence. In that 
case, he lacks an identity-constituting relationship with them despite his identity being in part 
constituted by his genetic relationship with them. To have an identity-constituting relationship 
with another is to conceptualize her not merely as shaping who one is but also what one cares 
about. Such relationships depend on the past, yes, but they also shape our futures. Our identity-
constituting relationships reveal who we want to be and to become. They are the relationships 
that, in Korsgaard’s terms, matter to how we value ourselves.  
 When someone with whom we have an identity-constituting relationship dies, we thus 
suffer a peculiarly acute loss. On the one hand, we suffer the loss of the various goods that 
person may have provided. Their deaths can mean the loss of one’s dining partner, co-parent, or 
artistic role model. Their deaths thus deny us the opportunity to pursue various goods we pursued 
in concert with them. In this regard, their deaths are losses to our selves. But one distinguishing 
feature of grief, one that seems closely related to the anxiety or distress many bereaved people 
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experience, is that the deaths of those with whom we have identity-constituting relationships also 
feel like losses of our selves. Many grieving persons report that they no longer recognize 
themselves – that the death of someone to whom they are attached has changed them in some 
fundamental way. (Morey 1995, Parkes and Prigerson 2010) Others’ deaths force us to change 
our relationship to them. (Andersen and Chen 2002, Shapiro 1994, Walter 1996) After all, we 
cannot relate to the dead as we can to the living. Our relationships with them can continue in 
some guise. Keeping a picture of a deceased loved one on your desk is a way to ensure that at 
least your end of the relationship continues. To remember someone is, after all, a way of relating 
to her. Yet we cannot participate in shared activities, communicate with them in the normal way, 
form plans with them, and so on. That we feel changed via grief should therefore not come as a 
surprise. For the death of someone standing in an identity-constituting relationship with us 
necessitates a change in what sorts of goods are available to us and what we might hope or plan 
for. Grief thus disorients us, inasmuch as patterns of feeling and acting with which we are 
familiar are no longer available to us. Our lives cannot proceed in precisely the same manner as 
they did before. When another’s death forces us to confront the question “what would I do 
without you?”, many of us do not have a ready answer. 
 This sense of disorientation helps explain why grieving can be emotionally multifaceted, 
even tumultuous.  As we noted above, emotional pain is only one element of the grieving 
process, a process which can vary from person to person and from grief episode to grief episode. 
That process may also include anxiety, bargaining, fear, anger, even joy. No doubt part of the 
reason grief is a stage-like emotional process is that we often harbor complex feelings toward 
those for whom we grieve. The death of a parent, for instance, marks a turning point in a 
relationship that is nearly always identity-constituting for a child. Rarely are the relationships 
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between parents and child dominated by a single emotional dynamic. It would thus be surprising 
for a child’s grief to exhibit a single emotional tenor either. 
 Grief, therefore, is a multistage emotional process that results when someone with whom 
we have an identity-constituting relationship dies. And because these relationships cannot 
continue as they did before, the others’ death feels like a loss of self, that is, the bereaved 
individual’s practical identity seems to rupture because she can no longer orient that identity 
around the deceased individual. Our grief reactions may seem unruly, even chaotic, in part 
because we are trying to make sense of who we are and what we care about in the aftermath of 
the other’s death. The observation that we grieve for those with whom we stand in identity-
constituting relationship inches us closer to a refutation of Meursault. We now know whom we 
grieve for, and (roughly) why. But we have not pinpointed the good that grieving can provide us, 
the good that can make the pains essential to grief good and worthwhile pains. For that, 
Augustine again comes to our aid. 
 
4. Grief as a motivator and source of self-knowledge 
In the course of his evidently arduous grief, Augustine interrogates his own soul. “I 
became a great enigma to myself,” he wrote, “and I was forever asking my soul why it was sad, 
and why it disquieted me sorely. And my soul knew not what to answer me.” (2006: book IV, 
chapter iv, 59) Augustine’s grief was disorienting too. He does not know entirely how to react or 
why. And upon introspecting — upon consulting his own ‘soul’ — Augustine does not find the 
answers he seeks. His soul cannot explain what is happening to him. He wants to understand his 
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own sadness, to grasp not only its origins but also its personal significance. Sadly, answers to his 
query were not forthcoming. 
 I want to suggest, however, that in the midst of his grief, Augustine was perhaps 
unknowingly asking the right kind of question. For grief is a particularly fruitful opportunity for 
an important human good: self-knowledge. 
 How does grief enable self-knowledge? For much of our lives, our outlook on the world 
operates on autopilot. We go about our daily business, pursuing our goals, trying our best to live 
well, and so on. We develop habits that reflect what we called earlier our practical identities. 
These habits easily become entrenched and normalized, and when they do, we can lose sight of 
how our practical identities assume a stable everyday environment in which to act upon them. Of 
course, we know that much in our everyday environment is contingent. We ‘know’, for instance, 
that our homes can be felled by earthquakes or other disasters, that our professional lives depend 
on institutions and practice that can totter, that our bodies may betray us via injury or disease. 
And we also ‘know’ that others, including those with whom we have identity-constituting 
relationships, are (like us) mortal. But in the day-to-day shuffle, these facts, though known, are 
often not fully appreciated, taken for granted and placed somewhere on our mental backburners. 
Our practical identities – the way we understand ourselves and what is valuable in our world — 
tend to assume a background reality. But that reality is metaphysically contingent. Those facts 
can change, even disappear entirely. 
 And when those facts change, those changes can jolt our evaluative systems. It may no 
longer make sense to care about particular places, people, or things if the reality in which our 
caring for them makes sense undergoes a shift, particularly when that shift is abrupt. When such 
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shifts occur, we must adapt to new material realities. But such shifts also motivate us to 
interrogate ourselves. After all, few things can do more to raise self-doubt than the sudden 
realization that your existing attitudes depend upon contingent realities, most of which are 
outside your control. To be reminded that the world could be different — nay, to have that fact 
vividly demonstrated through a profound change in the parts of the world that matter most to you 
— is also a reminder that you could be different. Just as the facts that make your practical 
identities feasible could change, so too could your practical identity change. And once that 
possibility arises in your consciousness, we begin to ask just who we are and what matters to us. 
We are thus set on a path toward self-knowledge.  
 The deaths of those whom we grieve can therefore motivate a search for self-knowledge. 
Recall again how grief disorients us. Others’ deaths are felt as loss both to and of the self. Their 
deaths remind us in particular of how our self-conceptions — who we believe ourselves to be— 
are predicated on the existence of particular others. When those others die, we can be reminded 
that our practical identities, which hinge upon their continued existence, are not inevitable or pre-
ordained. The disorientation of grief will tend to put our practical identities, and our very selves, 
under the microscope. And just as Augustine interrogated his soul, we interrogate ours in order 
to figure out who we are and how our lives should continue. Grief is therefore a powerful 
motivator of self-knowledge. 
 At the same time, grief is an aid to self-knowledge because its emotional richness makes 
it an especially robust source of self-knowledge. Grief episodes contain many emotions, all of 
which are focused on the relationship one has with the deceased. Different emotions disclose 
different aspects of our personalities and practical identities. In experiencing anger, we are given 
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hints as to what we regard as injurious or harmful to ourselves. In experiencing fear, we are 
given hints as to what we regard as threatening to ourselves. In experiencing joy or peace, we are 
given hints as to what we regard as providing security or stability. And so on for each of the 
emotions. Our emotional responses are revelations of different components of what matters to us.  
 Because grief episodes usually contain many distinct emotional stages, those episodes 
enable us to interrogate different elements of our selves. A grief episode that contains moments 
of anger, fear, and joy (say) provides us evidence about what we find valuable or worthwhile. To 
learn that we feel anger when we ponder how the deceased person hurt us informs us about what 
we care about. For example, anger at recalling an instance where the deceased person failed to 
attend an important event (your wedding or college graduation, say) tells us about the importance 
of that event in our lives and about our yearning to share it with others. Likewise for feeling fear, 
joy, or other emotions people experience in the course of grief. They too inform us about what 
who we are, what we care about, and the place of particular others in our network of cares. This 
is not to imply that this data needs no interpretation. Our emotions draw our attention to 
evaluatively salient facts, but they do not always immediately disclose to us the nature of those 
facts. Suppose that a child feels anxiety at the death of her parent. This anxiety could be the 
result of the child losing a relationship with the parent that was very secure. The parent’s death 
thus elicits anxiety in the child because a source of existing security was lost. Conversely, that 
same anxiety could reflect a child’s more checked history with her parents. A child with an 
emotionally distant parent may experience this anxiety as a kind of traumatic memory of past 
situations in which the parent did not provide the desired security. This example underscores that 
grief sets a task of self-understanding for us. A given emotional reaction (anxiety in this case) 
does not wear its object on its face. To know what this anxiety signifies requires interrogation of 
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one’s own biography. Making sense of grief’s emotional elements thus requires making sense of 
ourselves, i.e., attaining a form of biographical self-knowledge. 
Grief thus looks like our psyche’s way of instigating an emotional data dump. We would 
be wise to seize the opportunity to make sense of that data and thereby attain deeper levels of 
self-knowledge. 
 The pain of grief, I propose, is genuinely painful but one to which we can be attracted 
through a recognition that by fully engaging with that pain and with the cavalcade of other 
emotions we feel in the course of grief, we can enhance our knowledge of ourselves and our 
practical identities. Perhaps surprisingly, although grief is prompted by the deaths of others, it 
can put us in a position to relate to ourselves in more profound ways. In proposing that the value 
of grief — the value that makes even the pains of grief worth bearing — is self-knowledge, I am 
not suggesting that those who grieve know this or have self-knowledge as their conscious aim. 
Often we can pursue a good we recognize only inchoately. For we can know that something is 
valuable without yet knowing how it is valuable. With respect to grieving, we can be moved to 
grieve (and even be moved toward experiencing the more painful aspects of grief) without 
knowing what is moving us. But retrospective examination of grief episodes supports the thought 
that we often come to see that grief can provide us self-knowledge. When people talk of ‘putting 
their lives together,’ ‘figuring out how to go on,’ or ‘reaching closure’ (note in this last phrase 
the suggestion of finality, of ‘closing the book’ on the past), they are engaging in activities that 
betoken the search for self-knowledge. Moreover, whether an episode of grief has been valuable 
may only be discerned after the fact, by considering whether or not it culminated in self-
knowledge.  
 22 
The pains of grief can thus be vindicated by the self-knowledge grief can provide. Grief 
can therefore be instrumentally valuable, a special opportunity to improve our lives. Of course, 
those whose grieving does not result in self-knowledge may not appreciate that fact and may live 
out their lives ignorant of this lost opportunity. Yet the thought that our pains may in effect go to 
waste, that is, that those pains end up being simply painful without being redeemed or made 
good through self-knowledge, is itself a painful thought. 
 
5. Conclusion: Answering Meursault? 
In order to refute Meursault — to show that his inability to grieve is to be pitied rather 
than envied —we have had to rethink how we ordinarily think about pain. The pains of grief, I 
have argued, are good pains because and to the extent they are part of a larger activity that can 
catalyze the good of self-knowledge. Note the ‘can’ here: It would certainly be surprising if grief 
were necessarily good or worthwhile, since it certainly seems possible for grief not to culminate 
in self-knowledge. How successful grief is in that regard will depend on how grief unfolds and 
the degree to which the bereaved individual can embrace grief as an opportunity for self-
knowledge.  
Note also that on my model grief’s value is not intrinsic. The value of grieving is not to 
be found in properties that grief has as such. My suspicion is that the contention that grieving is 
intrinsically valuable endures because the ends invoked to make sense of grief’s supposed 
intrinsic value (that grief provides ‘closure’) are sufficiently vague or thin as to invite the 
inference that grieving just is worthwhile apart from whatever other goods it might foster. That 
said, I have not attempted to show that grief cannot be intrinsically good. But my claim that grief 
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can provide self-knowledge is sufficient to vindicate our sense that grief is worth undertaking, 
and I see little to recommend the thesis that grief is intrinsically valuable. 
One final point of clarification: It may be assumed that because grief has instrumental 
value in enabling us to order to acquire the greater good of self-knowledge, the pains associated 
with grief can only be unfortunate pains or ‘costs’, a claim I earlier denied. This assumption does 
not withstand scrutiny though. Granted, there is a sense in which the pains of grief, by virtue of 
being essential elements of grief, are instrumentally valuable with respect to self-knowledge 
because grief is instrumentally valuable with respect to self-knowledge. But it does not follow 
that these pains are themselves intrinsically bad, costs of grieving we tolerate in order to grieve. 
For one, relations of instrumental value do not only hold between bads and goods. Sometimes X 
may be instrumentally valuable with respect to Y without being bad at all; sometimes 
instrumental ‘goods’ are good, or at least neutral in value. Moreover, the value of grief’s pains 
need not bear the same relation to self-knowledge as it does to grief itself.  We do not suffer 
grief’s pains so as to attain a good found in grief, I have argued. And in those instances where 
grief does not culminate in self-knowledge, grief’s pains have not been vindicated. They are, in 
effect, uncompensated pains. This illustrates that the value of grief’s pains is contingent upon 
grief episodes being themselves valuable, i.e., yielding self-knowledge.  But it does not entail 
that grief’s pains contribute instrumentally to good grief, to grief that generates self-knowledge. 
There are crucial philosophical questions I have not addressed here. For one, I have not 
said how to grieve so as to attain self-knowledge. It is unlikely that every episode of grief results 
in enhanced self-knowledge. But if so, then the question arises of what should be done in order 
for grief to effect self-knowledge. Should a bereaved person enter therapy? Meditate? 
Memorialize the deceased? Which of these are most likely to yield the rich self-knowledge grief 
 24 
affords us? Unfortunately, I have said little on this score. Nor have I addressed the obvious next 
ethical question: Even if grief is a powerful opportunity for self-knowledge, what’s so good 
about self-knowledge? That question will also have to wait for another occasion as well. 
We might, finally, wonder what the best message is for us to convey to Meursault. After 
all, that grief is good, — and that the pain of grief can be worthwhile — because it augments our 
self-knowledge is not likely to be a message that resonates with him. As we noted at the outset, 
Meursault seems to lack the very identity-constituting relationships that make grief possible. 
Indeed, it is not even clear that Meursault, with his nihilistic tendencies, has a very robust 
practical identity, for there is not anything to which he appears committed in any lasting way. 
Hence, using grief as a way to increase his own self-knowledge does not seem to be a path 
available to Meursault, and any attempt to convince him to see the error of his ways would 
almost certainly not lead him to lament, or even rethink, his inability to grieve. While he cannot 
regret his inability to grieve, we can find it regrettable and worthy of pity. Nevertheless, the 
arguments offered here give us, the non-alienated, affectionate, interrelated and interdependent 
non-Meursaults of the world, reason to be glad for the opportunity to grieve. We should therefore 
be reassured in our convictions that grief is a crucial element of human life and that we have 
little reason to envy Camus’ protagonist. 
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